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Abstract – The choice of fuel type for a sodium-cooled fast reactor can have a significant impact 
on the severity of consequences arising from accidents, especially for severe accidents of low 
probability. The successful prevention, mitigation, or accommodation of all consequences of 
potential events, including accidents, is typically accomplished by using multiple barriers to the 
release of radiation, including the cladding on the fuel, the intact primary cooling system, and 
most visibly the reactor containment building.  More recently, this has also included the use of 
‘inherent safety’ concepts to reduce or eliminate the potential for serious damage in some cases.  
Past experience with oxide and metal fuel has demonstrated that both fuel types are suitable for 
use as fuel in a sodium-cooled fast reactor.  However, safety analyses for these two fuel types have 
also shown that there can be substantial differences in accident consequences due to the neutronic 
and thermophysical properties of the fuel and their compatibility with the reactor coolant. 
Accident phenomena are discussed for the sodium-cooled fast reactor based on the mechanistic 
progression of conditions from accident initiation to accident termination, whether a benign state 
is achieved or more severe consequences are expected.  General principles connecting accident 
phenomena and fuel properties are developed from the oxide and metal fuel safety analyses, 
providing guidelines that can be used as part of the evaluation for selection of fuel type for the 
sodium-cooled fast reactor. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There have been several types of fuel proposed for use 
in fast reactors, including oxide, metal, nitride, and 
carbide.  Early development in the United States in the 
1950’s and 1960’s focused on metal fuel, as was used in 
EBR-I and EBR-II.  Testing in EBR-II in the late 1960’s 
identified difficulties with achieving significant burnup 
with metal fuel, so the oxide fuel type that had been 
successfully used in commercial LWRs and naval 
propulsion was selected for further development in the 
FFTF and CRBR projects.  Internationally, oxide fuel was 
preferred as well due to the similarity with the fuels used 
in existing thermal reactors.  Subsequent metal fuel testing, 
both in parallel with oxide fuel development during the 
1970s and as part of the IFR program in the 1980s 
demonstrated that the burnup limitation could be overcome 
by changing the fuel pin design specifications.  Today, both 
oxide and metal fuel types have had significant 
development, testing, and operational experience, with 
either fuel type being available for use in a future fast 
reactor. 
The decision on which fuel to use in a fast reactor can 
be based on many criteria, including those related to fuel 
performance, fuel fabrication, safety implications, and 
processing, since fast reactors are usually used as part of a 
closed fuel cycle.  The safety performance of the reactor 
system is briefly discussed for both oxide and metal fuel 
types, identifying both similarities and differences that may 
be of safety significance.  
II. FAST REACTOR SAFETY 
Any nuclear facility must be designed and operated 
with the protection of the public and the environment as a 
priority.  Other than small test or research reactors, a fast 
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reactor would be licensed by the NRC after a detailed and 
comprehensive safety evaluation.  While CRBR was the 
first fast reactor being planned for construction after the 
formation of the NRC, the CRBR was in licensing 
proceedings when the project was terminated, so that 
CRBR was not licensed by the NRC.  In the 1990’s, as part 
of the ALMR program, General Electric was involved in 
discussions with the NRC on the PRISM design, which 
progressed to the point of a Preliminary Safety Evaluation 
Report being issued in 1994. With the termination of the 
ALMR program at that time, no further licensing activities 
were pursued.  As a result, the NRC does not have a set of 
regulations and requirements in place that have been used 
to license a fast reactor, but since the fast reactor would be 
an advanced reactor, there are general guidelines that 
would be used as a starting point for a safety evaluation.  
According to the NRC, there are several categories of 
accidents that will need to be evaluated for a prospective 
design.  There would be two general categories based on 
the probability of occurrence, Anticipated Operational 
Occurrences (AOOs), and Accidents, with the distinction 
being that AOOs are expected to occur at least once during 
the plant lifetime, while accidents are not expected to 
occur but are theoretically possible.  A special subcategory 
of accidents is the Anticipated Transient Without Scram 
(ATWS), where it is assumed that the scram system fails to 
operate.  This group is of particular interest in the fast 
reactor, as inherent safety principles can be used to prevent 
or mitigate serious consequences.  The guidance maintains 
the NRC position on both prevention and mitigation for the 
protection of workers, the public, and the environment.  
With this background, it is possible to discuss the relative 
impact of the choice of fuel type, oxide or metal, or any 
other fast reactor fuel type. 
III. FUNDAMENTAL THERMOPHYSICAL 
PROPERTIES AND REACTOR SYSTEM 
CHARACTERISTICS
The thermophysical properties of oxide and metal fuel 
are substantially different, and these differences play a role 
in the safety performance of the reactor system.  Typical 
fuel properties are summarized in Table I.  The difference 
in the thermal conductivity results in a much higher steady-
state operating temperature for oxide fuel, which along 
with the higher heat capacity, causes there to be more 
stored thermal energy in the reactor core for oxide fuel 
than for metal fuel.  It is also important to note that both 
oxide and metal fuel operate at about the same fraction of 
the melting temperature, roughly 80%, implying that both 
fuel types have approximately the same relative margin to 
melting during transient events.  For reference, the sodium 
coolant outlet temperature from the core is usually in the 
range of 500-550 °C (773-823 K), which is important in 
understanding the potential interaction between the fuel 
and the cladding for each fuel type.  For metal fuel, there is 
a chemical interaction between the fuel constituents and 
the cladding that lowers the solidus temperature for 
fuel/cladding alloys to 1000 K from the nominal 1675 K.  
For oxide fuel, the interaction is mainly a mechanical 
interaction between the fuel as it swells and stresses the 
cladding.  A more extensive discussion of fuel properties 
and performance is given in Ref. 1. 
TABLE I 
Fast Reactor Fuel Thermophysical Properties 
Fast Reactor Fuel Type 
Fresh Fuel Properties 
Oxide
UO2-20PuO2
Metal
U-20Pu-10Zr 
Theoretical Density, 
g/cm3
10.9 (673 K) 
10.1 (2373 K) 
15.5 (673 K) 
15.1 (1073 K) 
Melting Temperature, K 3000 1350 
Thermal Conductivity, 
W/cm-K 
0.043 (673 K) 
0.021 (2373 K) 
0.18 (673 K) 
0.28 (1073 K) 
Peak Centerline 
Temperature at 40 kW/m, 
K, and (T/Tmelt)
2360
(0.8)
1060
(0.8)
Fuel Cladding (HT9) 
Solidus, K 
1675 1000* 
Thermal Expansion, 1/K 0.9 – 1.8 x 10-5
(673-2373 K) 
1.7 -2.0 x 10-5
(673-1073 K) 
Heat Capacity, J/gm-K 0.29 – 0.46 
(673-2373 K) 
0.17 – 0.21 
(673-1073 K) 
The fuel pin designs for oxide and metal fuels are 
similar, but there can be many significant differences 
depending on design choices.  Examples of oxide and 
metal fuel pin and assembly designs are shown in Table II 
for ABR-1000, which in this report is used as a 
representative example of a modern fast reactor.2,3  In these 
examples, the fission gas plenum is located above the fuel, 
with a length of 1.5 times the core height, a typical value 
for high burnup fast reactor fuel pins, and the lower shield 
region below the fuel is part of the individual fuel pins.  
Note that the oxide fuel core is about 30% longer than the 
metal fuel core. The smear density in the fuel pin is 85% 
for the oxide fuel (to accommodate fuel swelling and to 
reduce the temperature drop between the fuel surface and 
the cladding) as compared with 75% for the metal fuel (to 
accommodate fuel swelling).  The oxide core height is 
larger to achieve the same burnup reactivity loss as the 
metal fuel, compensating for the lower heavy metal density 
of the oxide fuel as listed in Table I.  The oxide fuel pins 
are filled with an inert gas to provide thermal conduction 
between the fuel and the cladding since oxide fuel can be 
chemically reactive at normal operating temperatures.  
With the use of an inert gas, it is also possible to place the 
fission gas plenum below the core, which is in a region of 
much lower temperature and would result in lower fission 
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gas temperature, and thus pressure, inside the pin which 
may offer operational or other advantages.   
TABLE II 
Assembly Design Parameters of ABR-1000 Fuel 
Assemblies 
Fuel assembly 
Oxide Metal 
Assembly data 
- Number of pins 
- Assembly pitch, cm 
- Inter-assembly gap, cm 
- Duct outside flat-to-flat
    distance, cm 
- Duct thickness, cm 
- Gap between duct and 
    interior duct, cm 
- Interior duct thickness, cm 
- Interior duct inside flat-to- 
    flat distance, cm 
- Overall duct height, cm 
271
16.142
0.432
15.710
0.394
-
-
-
477.52
271
16.142
0.432
15.710
0.394
-
-
-
477.52
Pin data 
- Pin material and type 
- Bond material 
- Overall pin length, cm 
- Active core height, cm 
- Pellet smeared density,  
    % TD 
- Pellet diameter, cm  
- Cladding material 
- Clad outer diameter, cm 
- Pin pitch-to-diameter ratio 
- Cladding thickness, cm 
- Wire wrap diameter, cm 
MOX 
He
381.0
106.7
85.0
0.627
HT9
0.755
1.180
0.056
0.131
U-TRU-Zr
Na
332.7
81.3
75.0
0.557
HT9
0.755
1.180
0.056
0.131
Volume fraction at 
fabrication, % 
- Fuel or Absorber 
- Bond 
- Structure 
- Coolant 
37.0
2.0
25.7
35.3
29.2
9.8
25.7
35.3
Metal fuel pins are filled with sodium to provide the 
thermal bond between the fuel and the cladding, and this 
sodium is a liquid at normal reactor core operating 
temperatures. Metal fuel is chemically compatible with 
liquid sodium, and since liquid sodium has a much higher 
thermal conductivity than inert gas, this helps to lower the 
operating temperature for metal fuel as compared to oxide 
fuel when the fuel pins are operating at the same linear 
power and have comparable diameter (as in Table II).  For 
both types of fuel pins, the fuel swells with irradiation, 
closing the gap between the fuel and the cladding, greatly 
reducing the temperature difference between the inside 
surface of the cladding and the outer surface of the fuel. 
The fuel assemblies are hexagonal ducts containing 
the fuel pins.  The lower shielding is contained within the 
fuel pins, although it can also be placed separately in the 
lower part of the assembly, and not part of the fuel pins.  
The reactor core is assembled from these fuel assemblies, 
along with control, reflector, and shield assemblies.  The 
sodium coolant flowing through the core provides the heat 
removal capability from the fuel.  The relative placement 
of the main components of the reactor system, including 
the reactor core, steam generators, and turbines usually has 
the core at the lowest point in the system to encourage 
natural circulation flow in the event that forced flow is 
lost.  This is intended to be an example of a typical fast 
reactor system, and is used in this report to provide the 
basis for outlining the response of the system to various 
events and accidents. 
IV.  ANTICIPATED OPERATIONAL 
OCCURRENCES
As described above, AOOs are events that are 
expected to occur at least once in the lifetime of the 
reactor, i.e., events with a probability of about 10-2 per 
reactor year or greater.  These would include plant upsets, 
turbine trips, station blackout and other such conditions 
including those where the plant protection system would 
respond to protect the reactor.  As a result, differences in 
reactivity feedback between oxide and metal fuel are not 
relevant for these accidents.  Experience has shown that 
proper design of the reactor system with either fuel type 
can result in a satisfactory response, sufficient to ensure 
that the NRC goals are met for this class of events.
For this category of events, the main difference 
between oxide and metal fuel is the higher operating 
temperature and higher stored heat with oxide fuel.  On the 
one hand, the higher steady-state temperature and stored 
heat could be detrimental if the changes in plant conditions 
are such that the resulting temperature transient for the 
core and reactor structures presents challenges, e.g., peak 
temperatures are outside the allowable range for the system 
component.  On the other hand, lower stored heat with 
metal fuel could also be detrimental depending on the 
transient response, e.g., if coolant temperatures drop 
rapidly, there could be a thermal shock to system 
components.  Proper system design will account for these 
considerations in either case, such that an acceptable 
system is possible with either fuel type, but design details 
would likely be different.   
Another class of events in this category is a breach in 
the fuel pin cladding, also called ‘local faults.’  This occurs 
when there is a local failure of the fuel pin cladding, 
breaching the boundary between the fuel and the coolant.  
Such an event allows fission gas from inside the fuel pin to 
escape into the sodium coolant, and is detectable by 
monitoring the activity of the sodium coolant and the cover 
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gas region within the reactor vessel.  Experience has 
shown that such breaches are usually very small, and can 
result from excessive local stress on the cladding during 
operation, or cracking caused by cladding thinning or 
embrittlement.  Both oxide and metal fuel will release 
fission gas to the sodium coolant in this event. 
However, there is a significant difference in the 
subsequent behavior of the fuel if reactor operation is 
continued.  With oxide fuel, the fuel chemically reacts with 
the sodium coolant forming reaction products around the 
failure site.  The progression of this event may cause local 
overheating of the fuel pin due to reduction in size of the 
coolant channel and in heat transfer between the pin and 
the coolant, and enlargement of the breach due to the 
chemical reaction is also possible, potentially with the 
release of fuel to the coolant.4  Given these considerations, 
fast reactors using oxide fuel will usually have systems in 
place to detect fuel pin failure, sufficient to allow 
identification of the failed fuel pin or assembly, and 
procedures for shutdown and removal of the assembly 
before the effects of the breach increase.  In this way, 
‘local faults’ are managed with oxide fuel so that there are 
no further safety implications beyond fission gas release to 
the coolant. 
In contrast, metal fuel is not chemically reactive with 
liquid sodium (which is also used inside the fuel pin for 
thermal conduction between the fuel and cladding), such 
that in the event of a fuel pin breach, there is no chemical 
reaction at the failure site, and there is no tendency 
towards breach enlargement.  Experience has shown that 
failed metal fuel can be operated for extended periods of 
time without incident, aside from the release of fission gas 
to the coolant.  This allows more flexibility in planning for 
shutdown, as well as reducing concern that the failed fuel 
will cause further damage within the assembly. 
Since there are no differences of safety significance 
between oxide and metal fuel for AOOs, and given that 
both fuel types have been successfully used in fast reactors 
and that reactor performance is acceptable in both cases, it 
is reasonable to conclude that there is no significant 
fundamental difference in safety performance between 
oxide and metal fuel for this category of events. 
V. ACCIDENTS 
As described above, accidents are those events that are 
not expected to occur during the lifetime of the plant, 
approximately less than 1 x 10-2 per reactor year, but are 
theoretically possible based on the design of the reactor.  
For simplicity, the accidents can be classed in terms of 
multiple failures of major systems, possibly in combination 
with failure of the reactor or plant protection systems.  For 
the purposes of this discussion, it is useful to use the NRC 
goals of core damage frequency < 1 x 10-4 per reactor year 
and large release frequency < 1 x 10-6 per reactor year to 
categorize the types of accidents.  The first group could 
then be between 1 x 10-2 per reactor year and 1 x 10-4 per 
reactor year, where one would design the reactor to avoid 
core damage for accidents in this probability range,  
Accidents in this range can be considered to be the “design 
basis accidents (DBAs),” although one can include other 
accidents in this group.  These accidents could be ones 
where there is the failure of one major system as the 
accident initiator, also known as a single-fault accident, or 
multiple failures of other systems.  The accidents that tend 
to present the greatest challenges to the design limits tend 
to be the ‘single-fault’ accidents.  An example of such an 
accident is the loss of power to the coolant pumps, 
followed by reactor scram to shut down the reactor and 
prevent any serious consequences.   
The next group of accidents can be selected to have a 
probability of occurrence between 1 x 10-4 and 1 x 10-6 per 
reactor year, so that core damage may occur, but large 
releases are avoided.  Given this range of probability of 
occurrence, these accidents can involve the failure of two 
major systems, where they are known as ‘double-fault’ 
accidents, or even more numerous failures of other 
systems.  The greatest challenges to plant limits for this 
category of accidents tend to occur with the special cases 
of accidents where one of the failures is a failure to scram 
(anticipated transient without scram, or ATWS), such as 
loss of power to the coolant pumps followed by a failure to 
scram the reactor.  These accidents may be referred to as 
“beyond-design-basis accidents (BDBA),” if accidents of 
this probability have not been part of the design basis for 
the plant.
The last category of accidents is for probabilities of 
occurrence of < 1 x 10-6 per reactor year, where there is the 
potential for large releases to the containment and the 
environment could occur.  Accidents of such low 
probability have more severe accident initiators such as the 
failure of three or more major systems.  Examples would 
be the uncontrolled withdrawal of all control rods with 
failure to scram the reactor, or a very large seismic event 
that fails all of the pumps instantaneously along with 
failure to scram the reactor.  In the past, such accidents 
have been referred to as ‘residual risk’ or ‘emergency 
planning events,’ although it is not clear that such 
categories would be retained as the NRC licensing 
approach continues to evolve.  However, such categories 
are useful in the present discussion for relative 
performance of oxide and metal fuel to identify any 
differences in safety performance. 
V.A.  Accidents with Probability 10-2 to 10-4 per 
Reactor Year 
This class of accidents, where there is a failure of one 
major system, is typically accommodated by scram of the 
reactor to prevent damage to the core or any other parts of 
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the plant.  The reactor scram stops the fission process, 
quickly reducing power to decay heat levels, and making 
the accident consequences more of an issue of heat 
removal capability in light of the initial system failure. 
Due to the reactor scram, the difference between oxide 
and metal fuel becomes one of the different stored heat in 
the reactor during steady-state, being much higher for 
oxide fuel when linear power and fuel pin diameter are 
comparable for both the oxide and metal cores, as listed in 
Table I.  These events are similar to the AOOs, but with 
more serious consequences in the sense that the 
temperature transients will be larger, including exceeding 
temperature limits that apply to the AOOs.  In this sense, 
experience has shown that the differences between oxide 
and metal fuel are likely to be small, in that both fuel types 
have been used in a reactor with acceptable performance 
for DBAs, if appropriate accommodation is made in the 
design so that large consequences are avoided, i.e., there is 
still no core damage such as fuel melting, etc. 
V.B.  Accidents with Probability 10-4 to 10-6 per 
Reactor Year 
Many of the more challenging accidents in this 
category are associated with the failure of two major 
systems.  If the reactor is scrammed in response, then the 
issue becomes one of decay heat removal, as for the AOOs 
and DBAs.  In that case, it is likely that either oxide or 
metal fuel can be used as long as the design 
accommodations are made to prevent excessive 
temperatures or temperature variations (in this case, these 
events may be categorized as DBAs, but they don’t have to 
be).  If design accommodations are not made, so that the 
accidents are BDBA, especially if the accidents are ATWS 
events where there is a failure to scram, the difference 
between the two fuel types is more significant. 
In the case of an ATWS event, regardless of the fuel 
type, the fast reactor will respond depending on the net 
reactivity of the reactor core, with negative net reactivity 
reducing power while positive net reactivity increases 
power.  For an ATWS event, the net reactivity is 
determined by a balance of all of the inherent reactivity 
feedbacks, including fuel Doppler, control rod driveline 
expansion, sodium density change, etc.  The reactivity 
feedback is dependent on both fuel type and design details, 
especially for reactivity feedback from radial expansion of 
the core.  Analysis and testing has shown that it is possible 
to use the inherent reactivity feedback to limit the severity 
of the transient in ATWS events for both oxide and metal 
fuels, as long as appropriate design accommodation is 
made to limit reactivity feedback from phenomena that 
tend to increase core reactivity.5 In practice, this has meant 
more design accommodation when oxide fuel is used due 
to the high steady-state operating temperature for the fuel.  
It would be beneficial if the average fuel temperature in the 
oxide core is reduced, either by reducing the linear power 
or by reducing the pin diameter and using more pins per 
assembly, or other design options can be considered that 
will introduce favorable reactivity feedback in some cases.  
These approaches will lower the detrimental effect of fuel 
contraction of oxide fuel for accidents where reduction to 
decay heat power level is essential for avoiding severe 
consequences, such as loss-of-flow and loss-of-heat-sink 
events.  This is also relevant for transient overpower events 
as well, since any significant transient overpower accident 
will result in a loss of heat sink as the power level rises. 
The lower operating temperature of metal fuel makes it 
unnecessary to further lower fuel temperature or power to 
achieve an acceptable response. 
With the proper use of inherent reactivity feedback, it 
has been shown that it is possible to avoid large releases 
for this category of accidents for both fuel types, although 
some fuel melting (core damage) may occur, both of which 
are within the NRC goals for accident consequences.5
There is no failure of the fuel pin cladding, preventing 
release of fuel and fission products into the sodium 
coolant. 
V.C.  Accidents with Probability of less than 10-6 per 
Reactor Year 
This class of accidents is associated with multiple 
failures of major systems, with consequences that may be 
severe, up to and including large releases to the 
environment.  Evaluation of the differences between oxide 
and metal fuel for this category of accidents requires 
examination of experimental results on intentional 
overheating and failure of fuel pins and subassemblies, and 
the understanding developed about the behavior of fast 
reactor fuel under these conditions. 
For oxide fuel, the experimental results show that the 
important considerations are the melting point and the 
compatibility with the sodium coolant and core 
structures.6,7  Accident progression for such conditions 
typically begin with loss of adequate cooling for the core 
fuel, a failure to scram, and the inability of the inherent 
reactivity feedback to keep the power in balance with the 
heat removal capability of the coolant.  As a result, the 
core fuel overheats, possibly boiling the coolant, but 
leading to temperatures sufficient to melt both the fuel and 
the cladding.  Analyses have shown that there are several 
possibilities for the conditions in the assembly at the time 
of fuel melting, including cases where the liquid sodium 
coolant is still present, coolant is boiling, or the coolant has 
voided the assembly and only coolant vapor remains.  The 
coolant vapor may have substantial velocity as well.  If the 
assembly is voided of coolant, the stainless steel cladding 
can melt and be carried upwards by the sodium vapor into 
the cooler regions of the assembly above the core.  It is 
also possible that the fuel will melt at the same time, also 
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moving upwards along with the steel and coolant vapor, or 
that the fuel will fragment and the solid fuel pieces would 
move along with the steel and coolant vapor.  For many 
accidents, the end result of such material motion is that 
both the steel and/or fuel will solidify rapidly since the 
above core region is well below the melting point for both 
materials.  Experiments have shown that this will block 
flow (liquid or vapor) in the assembly, blocking any 
materials from moving upwards out of the core region. 
Once this occurs, the remaining molten materials in 
the subassembly will drain downwards, again into regions 
of the core that are well below the melting point of either 
the cladding or the fuel.  Similar solidification of the steel 
and/or fuel will occur, eventually preventing fuel from 
leaving the subassembly either upwards or downwards.  
Since there is still significant power generation, the molten 
fuel will melt through the assembly wall and the wall of 
the neighboring assembly, propagating the effects to the 
neighboring assemblies.8  Although uncertainty about the 
details of this process are high, the result is a growing 
molten region of fuel and steel, approximately contained 
within the original core boundary, but capable of arranging 
the molten fuel into configurations that will lead to 
significant positive reactivity, recriticalities, and excessive 
power generation.  Calculation of subsequent accident 
progression at this point is highly uncertain, and has been 
the subject of simulation development for several decades, 
but the end result is always an energetic event sufficient to 
permanently disperse the fuel so that further criticalities 
are no longer possible.  As part of the CRBR licensing 
process, such an event was assessed to possibly have the 
potential to threaten the containment, resulting in a large 
release to the environment.  Recent efforts have been 
exploring design options when oxide fuel is used for 
facilitating the downward movement of molten fuel so that 
recriticalities may be mitigated or eliminated by providing 
specific large channels within the core that would not 
readily be blocked by solidifying steel or cladding.  At this 
time, there appears to be a large uncertainty as to the 
effectiveness of such approaches.  The conclusion is that 
for these very unlikely severe accident conditions, using 
oxide fuel with its high melting point (which makes it 
impossible to cool molten oxide fuel with liquid sodium) 
will likely lead to energetic events that have the potential 
to threaten the integrity of the reactor vessel and the 
containment. 
For metal fuel, the experimental results show that the 
phenomena are completely different, and other issues 
become important.9,10  Metal fuel has a relatively low 
melting point and has the ability to form lower-melting-
point alloys by chemical interaction with the cladding, 
which can be a cause of cladding failure, but it also 
provides the ability to cool the molten fuel/cladding alloys 
with liquid sodium.  As discussed for oxide fuel, accident 
progression for the severe accident conditions being 
considered in this section begin with loss of adequate 
cooling for the core fuel, with a failure to scram, and the 
inability of the inherent reactivity feedback to keep the 
power in balance with the heat removal capability of the 
coolant.  As a result, the core fuel overheats, possibly 
boiling the coolant, but leading to temperatures sufficient 
to melt both the fuel and the cladding.  Simultaneously, the 
molten fuel interacts with the cladding to form alloys with 
relatively low melting points, below the boiling point of 
the sodium coolant.  Experimental results and analyses 
have shown that there are several possibilities for the 
conditions in the assembly at the time of fuel melting, 
including cases where the liquid sodium coolant is still 
present or the coolant is boiling.  For temperatures high 
enough to boil sodium coolant, metal fuel readily melts 
and interacts rapidly with cladding, failing the cladding 
and releasing fuel and/or fuel-cladding mixtures into the 
assembly coolant channels.  Either the liquid sodium or the 
coolant vapor can have velocity sufficient to carry molten 
materials upwards into the cooler regions of the assembly 
above the core.  In this case, unlike that for oxide fuel, the 
result of the material motion is that the fuel/steel mixtures 
do not solidify in the region above the core since the 
temperature of the above core region is at or above the 
melting point for the relocating fuel and steel.  
Experiments have shown that upward flow is not blocked, 
and that the fuel and steel will move well into the above 
core structure, perhaps out of the subassembly entirely.  
The removal of fuel from the core region prevents 
recriticalities as the accident progresses, and reduces or 
eliminates the potential for energetic events in the reactor.  
Unlike the case for oxide fuel, it appears that no special 
modifications are needed to facilitate removal of fuel from 
the core under these conditions.  This behavior is 
completely different from that for oxide fuel and is the 
result of the different thermophysical properties, alloying 
between metal fuel and cladding, and the ability to cool the 
relocating fuel materials with liquid sodium, resulting in a 
significant difference in safety performance between oxide 
and metal fuel.   
Experiments show that this behavior would be 
expected for severe transient overpower and loss-of-heat-
sink events, especially for irradiated fuel.  Experiments 
have not yet been performed for loss-of-flow conditions, 
although simulations using phenomenological models 
based on the available results indicate that the same 
phenomena would occur and prevent recriticality. 
VI.  SUMMARY AND OBSERVATIONS 
The preceding discussion has provided a brief review 
of the current understanding of the safety performance of 
fast reactors using oxide and metal fuel.  While there are 
differences for the two fuel types for all classes of events, 
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the only significant differences appear to occur only for 
events of extremely low probability, as follows: 
•  Probability > 10-2 per reactor year (AOOs) - no 
substantial difference, with proper design to accommodate 
the characteristics of each fuel type 
•  10-2 > probability > 10-4 per reactor year - no 
substantial difference, with proper design to accommodate 
the characteristics of each fuel type 
•  10-4 > probability > 10-6 per reactor year (core 
damage allowed) – no substantial difference if inherent 
safety principles are used and special design 
accommodation is made done to lower the steady state fuel 
temperature for oxide fuel to avoid significant positive 
reactivity introduction when power must be lowered to 
successfully survive a transient event 
•  Probability < 10-6 per reactor year (large releases 
allowable – there is a substantial fundamental difference 
between oxide fuel and metal fuel due to the high melting 
point of oxide fuel and the low melting point of metal fuel, 
along with the ability of metal fuel to alloy with cladding 
to form materials with lower melting points, facilitating 
fuel removal from the core early in the accident 
progression.   
The question becomes one of assessing the level of 
concern that one assigns to the extremely low probability 
events, since this is the only class of events for which there 
appears to be a significant fundamental difference in safety 
performance between oxide and metal fuel.  It is important 
to emphasize that the NRC has a goal of restricting 
accidents with potentially large releases to probabilities of 
less than 10-6 per reactor year.  With proper design and use 
of inherent safety principles, it is possible to achieve this 
goal for both oxide and metal fuel. The concern is one of 
assessing the risk to the public and the environment (and to 
the project) at such low levels of probability.  
While in principle it appears that both oxide and metal 
fuel can be used, there are some additional cautions that 
should be considered.  First, metal fuel has significantly 
less capability (or perhaps none at all) to threaten the 
reactor vessel and containment boundaries with energetic 
events resulting from accident conditions.  Second, even 
though large releases may be allowable for accidents with 
very low probability, one of the NRC principles beyond 
prevention and mitigation is delay time, i.e., time for 
evacuation of people in the event of a serious accident.  
The NRC requires that the containment doesn’t breach for 
at least 24 hours in these cases.  The difficulty with the fast 
reactor accidents considered in this discussion is that there 
would be very little time from the initiation of such an 
accident to the failure of the containment, if that were to 
occur, and is likely to be insufficient to allow any 
evacuation in a timely manner.  Third, for both fuel types, 
depending on the accident conditions (such as complete 
loss of any heat removal capability), it is possible to 
eventually fail the reactor vessel by melting through the 
vessel, resulting in core materials being released to the 
containment area.  Sufficient accommodation of this 
eventuality would be required. 
Overall, it is seen that both oxide and metal fuel can 
be successfully used in a fast reactor, and that the NRC 
goals can be met where core damage only occurs for 
probabilities < 10-4 per reactor year and large releases only 
occur for accidents with probabilities < 10-6 per reactor 
year.  The decision to choose one fuel type over the other 
based on safety performance depends on the judgment of 
the importance of accident consequences for extremely 
low probability events, and the potential risk given oxide 
fuel behavior for such extremely unlikely events. 
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